

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council


5 August 1982

Dear John:

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum --
"Likely Western Reactions If France Recognizes
North Korea" -- which may be of interest to
your colleagues.

Do let me know of any reactions, e.g., is
this sort of thing useful to you.

Sincerely



The Honorable John H. Holdridge
Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Room 6206, Department of State

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National Intelligence Council


5 August 1982

Dear Gaston:

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum --
"Likely Western Reactions if France Recognizes
North Korea" -- which may be of interest to
your colleagues.

Do let me know of any reactions, e.g., is
this sort of thing useful to you.

Sincerely



Dr. Gaston Sigur
National Security Council Staff
Room 302, Executive Office Building

STAT

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

5 August 1982

Dear Wever:

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum --
"Likely Western Reactions If France Recognizes
North Korea" -- which may be of interest to
your colleagues.

Do let me know of any reactions, e.g., is
this sort of thing useful to you.

Sincerely,



Wever Gim
Director, INR/East Asia
Room 8840
Department of State

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National Intelligence Council

5 August 1982

Dear Tom:

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum --
"Likely Western Reactions If France Recognizes
North Korea" -- which may be of interest to
your colleagues.

Do let me know of any reactions, e.g., is
this sort of thing useful to you.

Sincerely,



Thomas M.T. Niles
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs
NS 6219
Department of State

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

4 August 1982

LIKELY WESTERN REACTIONS IF
FRANCE RECOGNIZES NORTH KOREASummary

We do not believe that a French decision to offer diplomatic recognition to North Korea (DPRK) would result in a series of similar moves by other Western nations. Many of these countries have extensive trade relations with South Korea which they would be reluctant to jeopardize by taking a step certain to infuriate Seoul. Moreover, in view of North Korea's lack of international influence, its limited ability to engage in foreign trade, and its dismal record on repayment of external debts, the West Europeans probably would feel that they would gain nothing through recognition of the DPRK to compensate for the risks that this would entail for their relations with South Korea. In our judgment, the Greek government might be the only one inclined to follow the French lead. Like its socialist counterpart in Paris, it may view the establishment of ties with the North Koreans as a means for further strengthening its credentials in the Third World. [REDACTED]

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EUR M 82-10076

This memorandum, requested by the Assistant National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, was prepared by the Office of European Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed to the Chief of the European Issues Division [REDACTED]

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